Abstract: This analysis explores the determinants behind the unequal access to justice services among poor Indonesians. The study analyzes the stock of observed past disputes by socioeconomic group and the demand for conflict resolution services for unresolved conflicts or "trajectories." It also models the hypothetical demand of justice services for future disputes. Results suggest that unequal access to justice might go beyond the financial costs of seeking justice and also depends on individual preferences and community infrastructure. These findings warn against focusing exclusively on formal justice costs to improve the equal access of the poor to conflict resolution services.
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Introduction
There are significant gaps in the access to and utilization of justice services between the poor and the nonpoor across the world. This is no different from the well documented unequal access rates to public services across the developing world. World Bank (2016) recently reports large inequalities by socioeconomic status, geographical location and gender in the access to early child development services; quality education; health care (struggling to achieve universal coverage both in low and middle income countries); improved water and safe sanitation services; new or rehabilitated rural roads; and financial inclusion services that provide an entry point for otherwise unaccessiable formal credit services to the poor. Supply constraints, quality issues, urbanization, discrimination, costs, knowledge and preferences are all underlying factors in service access gaps. But while such gaps in public service delivery have been long agreed to be critical for improving current living conditions of the poor and breaking their intergenerational transmission of poverty, 2 unequal access to justice has attracted much less attention as a developmental problem (World Bank 2006) . Sustainable Development Goals framework may have shifted this by explicitly stating a goal, number 16, which promotes just, peaceful and inclusive societies (UN 2016).
As part of the literature on the socieoconomics of access to justice services, Buscaglia and Stephan (2005) report that the poor face significant difficulties in accessing justice services across multiple developing countries. In Colombia, Cuesta and Alda (2012) find that poverty is a 2 For a review of intetermporal transmission of poverty and unequal opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean see Molinas et al 2010 and in Africa, Cuesta and Abras (2012) .
significant factor affecting the access to institutional justice services ("houses of justice"). In the United States, where poor and middle-income Americans are reported to have similar "legal needs," 3 the poor seek assistance from a third party far less often than middle-income households (38 to 51 percent, respectively [ABA (1995) , cited in Hadfield (2010)] ). Yet very few studies focus on the specific reasons why the poor access justice at a lower rate. Buscaglia and Stephan's (2005) study argues that both direct and indirect costs and the poor's disproportionate lack of knowledge regarding their rights, obligations, and how to initiate proceedings explain their access gaps.
PEKKA and AUSAID (2010) report financial barriers such as fees and transportation costs as severe obstacles to accessing the court justice system in Indonesia. Neither study provides a sense of which reasons might be more important than others.
This study sheds more light on the specific determinants behind unequal access to justice by the poor and assesses, first, whether the poor and nonpoor have similar access to justice services and, second, whether socioeconomic aspects constitute a critical barrier to access to justice, formal and informal. This analysis focuses on demand for justice, or more precisely, on demand for conflict resolution services. A strict notion of access to justice (henceforth "A2J") demands the existence of a conflict, dispute, or circumstance that might potentially require justice services. In the absence of disputes, there cannot be access (or lack of access) to a service not demanded in the first place. Hence, this paper considers A2J as an unconstrained demand for conflict resolution services when (unresolved) disputes come up. Specifically, this paper analyzes how a series of potential constraints affect the demand for both formal and informal conflict resolution services.
The analysis carefully selects a number of constraints that potentially hinder demand, which are categorized as: (i) costs (legal direct costs, but also opportunity and transport costs); (ii) lack of 3 That paper defines legal needs as disputes eligible for treatment by the civil legal system. information and knowledge; (iii) availability of services, measured as the distance to the nearest facilities or providers; and (iv) beliefs, preferences, and perceptions about justice and existing justice services. As a result, the proposed analysis covers both demand as well as supply side constraints and, as discussed below, circumvents the traditional problem of selection bias, which is frequently present in analyses of service provision. In addition, this analysis comprehensively accounts for socioeconomic features of individuals and households as well as the characteristics of their respective communities.
This paper focuses on Indonesia, a country that recently approved a National Strategy on Access to Justice (NSAJ; BAPPENAS 2009), deliberately designed to reduce unequal access by the poor-especially women-and improve A2J for all. Indonesia is also an interesting case because of a rare and very rich household baseline survey that measures A2J services available prior to the implementation of the community-based Mediation and Community Legal Empowerment Project (MCLE), which aims to provide legal education and delivery support in the Aceh and Maluku provinces, both of which have experienced serious civil conflicts in the past. Although the survey is only representantive of the two provinces -and not the entire country-, what sets it apart is that it asks all individuals about their knowledge on legal services, their preference for conflict resolution alternatives, and their expected responses to future conflicts, that is, a hypothetical demand for justice services.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that intended behavior has been analyzed in the context of justice services. This analysis not only maximizes all of the information available from this unusually rich survey, but also circumvents the usual problems associated with selfselection in service demand. Furthermore, this analysis considers the demand for both formal and informal services-that is, court and off-court (institutionalized or not) services. As explained below, although the definition of formal and informal services is somewhat elusive, this paper follows best practices in the international and Indonesia-specific literature. In other words, this paper explores observed and hypothetical demand for formal and informal services across a number of dispute types, while accounting for personal knowledge, preferences, and perceptions.
Section 2 discusses the role of equal A2J within the existing justice strategy in Indonesia and the historical context of Aceh and Maluku provinces. Specific hypotheses to be tested and assessed across disputes, types of services (formal and informal), and provinces are presented.
Disputes considered in the analysis include all those reported in the MCLS survey, without this implying any judgment on specific disputes being more important in conflict settings than others.
Section 3 describes the MCLE survey used in the analysis and the methodological approach used to model the demand for justice of all individuals. Section 4 presents demand for justice trajectories by socioeconomic group and location, and section 5 reports key results. Finally, section 6 discuses those results and provides main conclusions.
Equitable Access to Justice in Indonesia
With a population of 250 million, Indonesia is the fourth most populous country in the world and the world's largest Muslim majority country. It is ethnically diverse with some 300 distinct native ethnic groups, living on some 6,000 islands, Its economy is the tenth largest in the world, and with a GDP per capita of US$ 3,520 (current prices), Indonesia is a middle income country (World Bank 2015 Challenges also remain in the justice system. When the country gained its independence, it inherited a legal system comprising traditional, colonial and Islamic legal influences, with
Europeans subject to Dutch law and Indonesians to traditional customary or adat law-itself highly diverse with as many as 300 discrete ethnic groups with their own forms of adat (Szczepanski, 2002) . In 1945, a uniform legal system was established and promoted, without this meaning the demise of customarily law: instead, support for non-state or informal justice is also reflected in national government policy documents, which state the need to respect and strengthen traditional customary law as a key government policy aim (Government of Indonesia, 2004) . This has been reinforced by the process of regional autonomy launched in Indonesia in 1999 where informal dispute resolution have been also promoted and village heads, together with the Adat Council, were given authority to resolve disputes (Stephens and Clark 2008) .
In practice, however, trying to accommodate diverse and pluralistic legal traditions, while respecting the supremacy of the constitution and national legal safeguards has proven very difficult.
There exists a tension between formal and informal justice services in Indonesia, with some observers concluding that "written state law will always trump customary law" (Stephens and Clark, 2008: 7) . At the same time, provinces like Maluku, West Sumatra and Central Kalimatan, have been pushing to strengthen traditional village structures and recognition for adat leaders, in line with an increasing demand of Indonesians to redress their legal grievances through informal, or non-state, justice systems-with some estimates suggesting as many as 90% of disputes are handled outside state institutions (Stephens and Clark 2008) . In some cases, however, this process has resulted in a narrow notion of local justice, that marganizes women and ethnic minorities and can create social cleavages that lead to violent conflict and in turn poverty, threatening the right of citizens of all backgrounds to be treated equally (Woodhouse 2004 ). provision of justice as a fundamental right to ensure equality before the law. As such, the state imposes on itself the obligation to provide accessible and fair service to people from all levels of society, regardless of their socioeconomic status. To achieve this goal, the state must help citizens be aware of, understand, and make use of basic legal services, through both formal and informal justice institutions.
The proposed solutions in the NSAJ focus on three pillars: first, moving from legal formalism to a social justice paradigm; second, strengthening paralegal services, especially in the areas of legal information and awareness; and, third, integrating efforts across providers, both public and nongovernment players, and across sectors-health, education, roads, water, and economic development.
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On paper, the proposed strategy to reduce unequal access covers the major areas of the diagnosed problem. In practice, however, even when the NSAJ is emphatic regarding reducing access barriers among the poor, it does not attempt to prioritize them nor explicitly state which are comparatively most important. To better understand the effects of the spate of proposed interventions-which is crucial in a restrictive and inefficient budgetary context-this study provides insights on the relevance of economic costs vis-à-vis other barriers to equal A2J in
Indonesia.
This analysis focuses on two provinces, Aceh and Maluku, both poverty-ridden and with a recent history of severe civil conflict that may have influenced interpersonal and community
relations. Yet, both present interesting differences. Conflict in Aceh was long , The key questions that this study addresses refer to the factors that influence the demand of conflict resolution services in the two postconflict provinces of Aceh and Maluku; the comparative role that costs play vis-à-vis individual and household characteristics and community characteristics in the demand for conflict resolution services; the differences in demand of formal and informal services; and the differences in results for poor and nonpoor population groups. Specifically, this study analyzes three hypotheses:
Hypothesis #1: The cost of A2J is the most significant determinant behind observed differences in the demand of conflict resolution services in the analyzed provinces of Aceh and
Maluku. This follows the unaffordable cost of formal justice services in the country, as widely acknowledged by the NSAJ and other studies in Indonesia.
Hypothesis #2: Demand for conflict resolution services is not homogenous in the provinces analyzed, with factors such as socioeconomic status, types of conflict, and nature of servicesformal and informal-all playing substantive roles (although of unequal magnitude).
Hypothesis #3:
Demand for conflict resolution services shows substantive differences in Aceh and Maluku as a result of the different natures of their conflicts and how these conflicts may have affected interpersonal and community relations.
Data and Methodology

MCLE 2008 Baseline Survey
This study benefits from a household survey baseline, the Mediation and Community Legal were asked what type of services they would seek if confronted with several types of conflict or disputes. This constitutes a unique feature of the survey, because it permits the construction of a hypothetical demand for justice services (formal and informal) across the entire sample (section 3.3 includes the exact questions and disputes analyzed). Companion surveys were conducted for key informants in the village, typically village authorities and informal leaders. These surveys collected information on geographical accessibility, access to state institutions and services, social capital or presence of community organizations, and key sources of activity in the village. World Bank (2010) provides a more detailed description of the survey design.
Demand for Justice
Analyses of demand for services traditionally focus on households or individuals that have a need for the service in the first place. In the case of demand for primary education, for example, demand analysis focuses on households with children of primary education age. Similarly, in the demand for justice services, a conflict situation needs to exist in order for households or individuals to have an opportunity to decide on whether or not to demand justice services. It is reasonable to assume that those households with no conflict (or with a conflict already resolved)
are not likely to demand conflict resolution services. In the case of the MCLE survey, this implies focusing only on 10 and 12 percent of the samples in Aceh and Maluku, respectively (see conflict "resolution trajectories" in figure 1). However, this focus on households with unresolved conflicts may lead to a sample selection bias if there are specific reasons why certain households:
(i) do not observe conflicts while others are more prone to conflict; (ii) are less likely to resolve them peacefully and unassisted by conflict resolution services; or (iii) are less likely report their disputes. Indeed, as the next section shows, the poor have more disputes than the nonpoor, and they also seem to be less effective in solving them through direct negotiation, in both Aceh and
Maluku (see Appendix 1 online).
The MCLE survey provides a rare opportunity to deal with the issue of sample selection bias in the demand for justice services. Households are not only asked to report conflicts they had in the last two years, but also how they would confront hypothetical disputes in the future, that is, which individual or institution they would seek help from. Critical for the demand analysis, this question is asked to every household in the survey, which eliminates the potential problem of sample selection bias raised when focusing only on those who had had a conflict in the past. A possible source of endogeneity would emerge when using justice services contributes to shaping personal attitudes, preferences, and trust in those services. These problems will be relevant to the extent that policy making in Indonesia, and in particular in Aceh and Maluku, are sensitive to demand issues: in other words, if the allocation of resources to the provision of justice is sensitive to the changing demands of the population. If resources are allocated following centralized inertial rules, or decentralization fails to effectively respond to population demands, it will hard to argue in favor of demand driving supply decisions in the short run. There is no proper evaluation of whether that is the case, but the NSAJ argues that one of the key structural problems in the provision of justice in Indonesia has been a justice budget not sensitive to the specific needs of the sector (BAPPENAS 2009).
Dependent Variables
The dependent variable in this study, demand for justice services, is a set of binary variables summarizing three alternatives based on the answers to the question on hypothetical disputes asked in the MCLE survey: individual does not know; he or she would resort to informal services; or he or she would resort to formal services. 
Independent Variables
Several factors are included in the model for demand for justice in line with the standard literature on the demand for basic services, such as education or health (see seminal work by Gertler and Glewwe [1990] ). Specific to Indonesian justice services, a number of barriers mentioned by PEKKA and AUSAID (2010) ii) community characteristics (population; majority religion; village location; main economic activity; transport conditions; and presence of community organizations);
iii) supply of justice services (at the household level, distance/time and cost to reach courts, police and other specific nonformal options, and, at the community level, presence of conflict resolution programs in the community); and iv) preferences and knowledge at the personal level (personal preference for formal or informal resolution of conflicts; trust in institutions).
Appendix 2 online shows that the MCLE respondents, on average, are in their midforties, and are mostly household heads (about two-thirds); half of them are male and have primary or secondary education. More than 80 percent of the respondents are married and live in the same district they were born in. About half typically work in the agricultural sector. Overall, they report to trust formal institutions more than informal options, something that contrasts with their reported preference to seek assistance in informal institutions when a hypothetical conflict situation arises.
Appendix 2 online also presents community characteristics. On average, households confirm that access to police is quicker and cheaper than other security-related options. Almost 80 percent of households report that their communities have good roads, and, when asked about organized groups in the community, respond that the most common of such organizations are religious, student, sports, and farmers' groups. The majority of the population sampled identified themselves as Muslim.
Empirical Strategy
The empirical strategy consists of a two-stage estimation that separates the effects that personal characteristics, , of each individual have on the demand for types of justice servicesformal, informal, don't know-from the effects of community variables, . In a first stage, three linear probability models with community fixed effects are estimated separately for informal services, formal services and "don't know," respectively. This implies that the dependent variable capturing the demand for informal (formal) services bundles formal (informal) services with the "don't know" option. The alternative to "don't know" responses bundles formal and informal services. While it may not be ideal to include formal services with don't know responses in the same category, this follows similar practices in the analysis of other services such as demand for (primary, secondary or no) health care or (private, public or no) education services. Nonetheless, the three categories could also be modeled as a multinomial choice model for the three types of justice services. This strategy would not avoid the bundling of alternative categories, however. Furthermore, the shortcoming in this alternative approach is that it becomes too complicated and cumbersome if community fixed effects are introduced in the analysis.
Finally, the proposed model only considers the first-option service demanded by the individual in the case of an unresolved dispute. As a result, the analysis does not include second-and thirdoption demanded services to avoid additional complications that would be otherwise introduced by way of estimating probabilities of demanding additional services conditional of other options failing to solve the hypothetical dispute.
Each specification in this first stage controls for individual and household factors as well as community-level fixed effects that control for all observed and unobserved variables at the community level that could influence the demand for justice services. This way, one can ascertain the role individual variables net of the influence of all kinds of factors at the community level, some of which may be observable or measurable and others unobservable.
In the second stage, the estimated community-level fixed effect is regressed (using ordinary least squares [OLS]) on all the observed community characteristics to decipher the contribution of observed community characteristics, denoted by , on the community-level demand for justice net of the influence of individual characteristics. The observable community characteristics include demand-related elements such as community's population size and supply-related factors such as the distance to an institutional provider of justice resolution. Other community-level variables considered in this second stage include distance to courts and costs of such services; predominant type of livelihood in the community; availability of transportation (particularly the presence of roads); and presence of community organizations.
The two-stage strategy offers one key advantage, thanks to the MCLE survey's unprecedented breadth of individual and household-level variables: inclusion of the communitylevel fixed effects allows the analysis to ascertain the influence of individual variables on the demand for justice services net of the effect of both observable and unobservable community characteristics. A regression including both individual and observed community characteristics may or may not yield the same coefficients for the individual-specific determinants of the demand for justice, depending on the extent to which the unobserved community characteristics typically included in the error term of the regression are correlated with observed individual and community characteristics. Thus, the inclusion of the community fixed effects is likely to reduce the omitted variable bias that may otherwise be present in the coefficients of the included regressors. One shortcoming of the inclusion of the community fixed effects is that it is a "blunt instrument" in the sense that it is not possible to say anything about the role of community-level characteristics in the demand for justice services. This shortcoming is remedied by the secondstage regression, whereby the estimated fixed effect from the first stage regression is regressed against the observed community-level variables. The latter regression may also be subject to omitted variable bias, depending on the nature and the size of the correlation between the omitted or unobserved community-level variables and the observed ones included in the secondstage regression. In this case, however, the omitted variable bias, to the extent that is significant, has an effect on the estimates of the second-stage regression and not on the estimates of the first-stage regression. were unable to resolve their conflict on their own. Thus, only 10 households out of 100 faced unresolved conflicts that might have potentially required some form of justice service. Out of these 10, four households did nothing and another four sought a local leader to solve the problem. The 6 In any case, as a robustness check, the analysis is also carried out using a specification that includes both individual and household characteristics along with community characteristics in a single equation, as in equation [3] . Results are reported online in appendix 3.
remaining two households out of the 10 with a demand for justice services sought the police, family, or a court to solve their conflict. Disputes in Maluku followed a similar trajectory: 16 out of 100 households had a dispute and only nine had either an unresolved dispute following direct negotiation or a dispute that did not follow direct negotiation. Out of these unresolved disputes, six households did nothing or sought a local leader and one sought the police. Interestingly, courts in that province were not among the providers sought by households with unresolved conflicts.
Figure 1 about here
Appendix 2 online compares the conflict resolution trajectories in Aceh and Maluku, respectively, by socioeconomic group, that is, among the poor and the nonpoor. Poor households in this study are defined as those at the bottom two quintiles of the distribution of household consumption expenditure per capita and nonpoor as those households at the top three (mid and upper) quintiles of the distribution. Three results stand out: first, the incidence of all disputes is larger among nonpoor than poor households. Second, the incidence of unresolved disputes (after either direct negotiation or no negotiation) is also larger among the nonpoor. Third, in relative terms, the poor are more likely to do nothing than the nonpoor to address their unresolved disputes.
In contrast, the nonpoor are more likely to go to police (see appendix 1) in Aceh. In Maluku, as appendix 1 shows, the poor have comparatively more disputes than the poor in Aceh. In spite of this, the poor in Maluku have the same number of unresolved disputes than in Aceh. Poor households in Maluku are less likely to do nothing; equally likely to go to a village leader; and (three times) more likely to go to the police than the poor in Aceh attempting to resolve their pending conflicts. In Aceh, neither the poor nor the nonpoor reportedly seek court services.
The estimated trajectories for specific offenses show that the incidence of unresolved disputes (either after direct or no negotiation) varies substantially by type of offense and between poor and nonpoor groups (not shown here). Differentials are substantive, ranging from 95 percent of theft disputes unresolved in Aceh among the nonpoor (100 percent unresolved among the poor)
to 55 percent resolved disputes on natural resources among the poor in Maluku (54 percent among the nonpoor). More than 28 percent of all ID-related disputes are resolved through direct negotiation in Aceh-more ethnically homogenous-compared to a meager four percent in Maluku. Nonetheless, doing nothing and resorting to a village head, respectively, remain the two most reported responses to unresolved conflicts in both provinces. Among formal service providers, police and religious courts typically top the preferred formal options, although they are well behind the two options of doing nothing and seeking the village head, as already noted.
Results from the analysis of conflict resolution trajectories confirm the validity of hypotheses 2 and 3. In effect, demand for conflict resolution services is not homogenous in the two analyzed provincies in Indonesia. Demand varies across socioeconomic groups and by type of dispute between the two provinces analyzed. Even though there is some degree of similarity among the types of disputes that households typically report, conflicts across villages or communities are not similar between Aceh and Maluku.
Interestingly, there are marked differences among the main motivations explaining the reported behavior of individuals facing disputes, but costs are not the key driver. Appendix 2 online shows that the leading cause for inaction in Aceh is the household's belief that the dispute is not important or, if important, implies a serious reputational risk not worth taking: some 65 percent of those households doing nothing linked their behavior to that reason. Another 17 percent of the sample reported lack of knowledge. High costs were cited by only 3 percent of such households.
Distance to service providers (formal or informal) was reported by only 0.5 percent as the main cause for inaction. In Maluku, lack of knowledge was the main reason cited for not seeking conflict resolution services, according to 69 percent of the respondents. The second main reason in Maluku was the perception of irrelevance or reputational issues, reported by 16 percent of inactive households. Again, costs were mentioned by only 4 percent and distance by only 5 percent of households. From this evidence, knowledge and perceptions seem to play a more important role in failing to demand services than costs, which negates the validity of hypothesis 1. This evidence is, however, not fully conclusive because it only includes the motivation of a proportion of the sample, those reporting a dispute in the first place. 7 In addition, the question remains whether such reasons play out when individuals decide to demand formal versus informal services. Section 5 analyzes the factors behind those decisions, following the empirical model developed in section 3. Table 5 reports the results for the first-stage specification focusing on individual and household characteristics, and controlling for community-level fixed effects. As noted above, these estimates are obtained from the application of a linear probability model, which implies that the reported coefficients are also estimates of the marginal effects of individual characteristics on the probability of giving an affirmative (=1) response to the question posed. The dependent variable is a binary variable that captures the most common self-reported first option justice service demanded by each individual facing five hypothetical disputes (including don't know as an alternative option to formal and informal type of services).
Econometric Results
Overall, a number of individual-level variables appear to have a significant role in explaining the demand for conflict resolution services, even after accounting for the influence of community-level observed variables. Column 1 in This might reflect the fact that wealth allows the resolution of disputes in one's favor more likely through informal means, where affordable lower bribes may be relatively more effective compared to formal justice services (where required bribes may be only within the means of a very small elite). Column 3 in table 5 also shows that younger adults, as well as the more educated (that is, those with primary or secondary education compared to those with no education), seek more formal resources, as well as housewives (seeking divorce, for example) and other related occupations. Apparently income does not to play a role in the demand for formal assistance for the resolution of disputes. This, however, might be a reflection of the fact that the education variable already captures the underlying socioeconomic effect on formal service demand. The reported trust in formal or informal services does not lead to a significant preference for demanding the respective service once incomes are controlled for. This is somewhat surprising, but consistent with-either or both-individuals overestimating the true levels of trust that they report in their responses and/or personal preferences alone not being sufficiently strong to opt for one or other type of service. This alternative would also help explain the comparatively low explanatory power that individual characteristics have in predicting demand for formal services (see table 2 significance statistics).
Table 2 about here
Second stage estimates reveal that that only a few of the observed community-level variables have a significant role in the demand for services, net of the influence of individual and household variables. Specifically, a larger population increases the probability of reaching out to formal justice services. By occupation, being a fisherman decreases the likelihood of answering "don't know," but does not increase the probability of seeking either formal or informal services.
This may be an indication of a higher presence of conflicts in fishing communities (where disputes for the rights related to the use of waters are common) and, therefore, a higher exposure to and disposition toward resolving conflicts. The nonstatistically significant coefficients of the distance to religious and state courts on the community fixed effect model for formal and informal justice services cast doubts on the importance of distance to affect the choice between formal and informal services. This needs to be carefully assessed because the variable capturing the presence of good roads has a significant and positive effect on the likelihood of using formal services (and responding "I don't know"). Finally, the presence of active farmers or parents groups in the community has a positive significant effect in explaining demand for formal justice services and an opposite effect if active religious or women's groups are also present in the community (see table   3 ). 
Conclusions
Evidence from the analysis of the answers regarding hypothetical disputes reported in the MCLE survey shows that A2J depends on a number of factors other than financial considerations. The model presented here for the demand for informal and formal services shows that household incomes increase the probability of demanding an informal service to solve conflicts-typically the village leader-but incomes are not alone in increasing or decreasing the demand for formal services. Education, gender, position in the household, and marital status of individuals also explain demand for services, while the presence of community groups and of good roads explain -although marginally-a share of the demand for services that individual and household factors cannot. The evidence from the econometric analysis supports the preliminary findings from trajectories, even though they are not strictly comparable. Only 4 percent of those failing to do something to resolve a conflict report high costs as the main cause for their choices (or inaction). In other words, results following different methodologies-trajectories and econometric techniques-and different samples-observed and hypothetical disputes-suggest that costs might neither be the only nor the main barrier for differentiated access to these services.
This result therefore questions the relevance of previous conclusions on marriage-and identification-related disputes elsewhere in Indonesia (see PEKKA and AUSAID [2010] and McLaughlin and Perdana [2010] ) indicating that waiving fees for divorce and ID cards significantly increased the use of religious and civil courts among Indonesian women. We attribute this discrepancy to the selection bias intrinsic in previous analyses of disputes. Incomes affect how likely a household is to engage in (unresolved) disputes in the first place. Also, the trajectory results show that dispute incidence is different among the poor and the nonpoor and across disputes. Once this bias is removed by considering the demand of justice services for hypothetical disputes, results are consistent with non-income factors having a significant contribution to the type of justice services demanded.
However, these findings should not be taken as unequivocal evidence against financial costs being drivers of the demand of justice services in Indonesia or, more specifically, in the two analyzed provinces. In effect, self-reported responses may reflect the existing (or perceived) supply of available services. The very decision to peacefully resolve a dispute may also depend on costs expected from service resolution in the first place. Although perceptions, preferences and knowledge are controlled for in the analysis, it is possible that cost-related biases may still affect the findings in this analysis.
Cautiously interpreted, these results preliminary suggest that a strategy of slashing costs of justice may affect the choice of services among those already convinced-and capable-of seeking conflict resolution services in the first place. But unless other structural issues at the personal, household, and community levels are addressed-from education aimed at understanding legal options to interpersonal relationships within a community-interventions making legal justice cheaper may not be entirely effective on their own.
More research is needed on the specific impacts that awareness, knowledge, and perceptions have on the demand for formal and informal services by each type of dispute. More research is also needed to better understand variation in the demand of services within poor and non poor categories of households (and not just between categories) as well as the sequence of alternative justice services indivdiuals demand when first-option services fail to solve the dispute. The socioeconomic status of the other party involved in a dispute might also play a role in the demand for justice services, but this effect cannot be analyzed with available data. Furthermore, this analysis is not representative from a national point of view, and the provinces analyzed here may or may not be a good fit for other provinces in Indonesia. As a result, these conclusions cannot be necessarily generalized to all regions of the country or across countries. 
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